#好文回顧 #SPAC
根據 INSIDE 報導,軟銀願景基金 CEO 宣佈將以 SPAC 方式在美上市。
大家對 SPAC 這個詞也許比較陌生,但「空殻公司」可能會有印象。那到底什麼是 SPAC?
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島讀曾分析過的房地產新創 Opendoor 最近其宣布將成為上市公司。但它不走傳統的 IPO 流程,而是透過特殊目的收購公司( SPAC)來上市。根據 TechCrunch 報導:
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由 Chamath Palihapitiya 協助創立的「空白支票公司」Social Capital Hedosophia II 宣布,將與 Opendoor 合併,在過程中將該房地產新創帶入公開市場。
市場對 SPAC . . . 有高度興趣。SPAC 是可公開交易的公司,透過尋求合併來完成私人公司的上市,以避免 IPO 過程的麻煩。
. . . . Opendoor 的交易定價為 48 億美金 . . . Social Capital Hedosophia II 將提供本交易所需的「最高」4.14 億美金,另外「私人投資於公開股份的交易」(private investment in public equity transaction, PIPE)則會提供額外的 6 億美金。
在 PIPE 的 6 億美金中,2 億美金將由 SPAC 的投資人提供,其中 Chamath Palihapitiya 將個人出資 1 億美金。
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SPAC 在 1980 年代紅過一陣子。中文有時稱之為「空殼公司」,用來讓私有公司可以「借殼上市」。過去 SPAC 的名聲不好。不過近年來熱錢滾滾,急尋新的投資商品,於是 SPAC 捲土重來。
#什麼是SPAC?
SPAC 基本上是一個資產的空殼,由一位具有號召力的發起人(sponsor)募集。如本次交易的 Social Capital Hedosophia II 是由矽谷知名投資人 Chamath Palihapitiya 發起。SPAC 會先走一遍傳統 IPO 流程,成為公開上市公司。然而 SPAC 的唯一目標就是找到私有公司,與之合併,讓該私有公司轉為上市公司。
投資 SPAC 有點像參加團購,只是團購的東西是一家私有企業,而且尚未決定。
SPAC 的資金會先存在信託(trust)之中。一般 SPAC 有兩年時間尋找標的,若找不到就把錢還給股東。在這段時間內 SPAC 的股票也都可以公開交易。如果合併完成,則 SPAC 募集的資金自然交給該私有公司,而 SPAC 股東則成為新合併公司的股東。發起人則可以抽管理費。
#SPAC有什麼優點?
最重要的優點是確定性高。對未上市公司來說,上市變成一個合併案,只需要跟一個對口單位談,就能明確知道將來股票的價格。
另一個優點是快。SPAC 已經走完了上市流程,因此未上市公司不用經歷監管單位的審核。只要 SPAC 發起人看好,並且說服股東同意就行(通常合併前會有一次股東投票)。傳統 IPO 流程慢則一年以上,SPAC 合併可以在數月到數週內完成。
#投資SPAC的風險比較高
一開始投資人無從判斷公司的「基本面」,如現金流、盈虧等;只能從發起(團購的)人判斷。因此 SPAC 的發起人的聲望特別重要,可說是另類的「網紅經濟」。
但不是所有公司都適合 SPAC。許多大型「獨角獸」寧願走傳統的 IPO 流程。一方面是因為嚴格的審核本身是一種品質保證。另一方面是 IPO 本身就是重要的行銷機會。再來,IPO 需找到投資銀行承銷,如高盛、摩根史坦利等。這些投資銀行的認可也是一種價值。
在本協議中,SPAC 上市時共募資 4.14 億美金。現在其要合併估值 48 億美金的 Opendoor — 或者說買下 Opendoor 將發行的價值 10.14 億美金的股票 — 錢不夠。這很常見。因此 SPAC 必須另外再找 6 億美金。
這筆額外的資金稱之為 PIPE。可以想成是 Opendoor 私募一輪,由 SPAC 領投,另外要找人跟投。因此嚴格來說 Opendoor 還是得去跟一些機構投資人簡報。只是對 PIPE 的投資人來說,其承擔的風險更低 — 因為公開上市已經完成,大眾投資人的錢已經進場了。
#SPAC再度流行
今天的 SPAC 比 1980 年代更正規化。不論發起人、機構投資人與未上市企業也都更成熟,或許不會又淪為「割韭菜」、中飽發起人私囊的工具。SPAC 讓大眾可以更快投資到那些傳統上還無法 IPO 的公司。也鬆動了由投資銀行把持的市場,讓更多人可以主導企業上市。但這是好是壞,要看你對風險的態度。
歷史上 SPAC 盛行於資本過熱,錢無處去的時代,而且經常接著經濟危機。而通常會選擇 SPAC 上市的是那些風險高、傳統資本市場不擅長評估的,或是需要把握時機快速上市的公司。
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全文閱讀:
Opendoor 經 SPAC 上市 — SPAC 是什麼 |Opendoor 房地產全程平台(會員限定)
https://bit.ly/3jZ4Jjq
private investment中文 在 陳冠廷 Kuan-Ting Chen Facebook 的最佳貼文
I have recently perused Nicholas Kristof’s NYT piece “China’s Man in Washington, Named Trump”(https://nyti.ms/3h2JXh8). One paragraph in particular caught my attention: “A joke in China suggests that Trump’s Chinese name is Chuan Jianguo, or “Build-the-Country Trump.” That’s because Build-the-Country is a common revolutionary name among Communist patriots, and it’s mockingly suggested that Trump’s misrule of the United States is actually bolstering Xi’s regime.”
Kristoff also avows that since Trump’s ascension to presidency, the American nation became highly polarized. This is reflected in the current administration’s policies on climate change, foreign relations with established U.S. allies, and COVID-19 prevention, all of which are rather ineffective. It also seems like Mr. Trump and his team diverged from the traditional priorities, including promoting free trade, human rights, and other quintessentially American values. As described thoroughly by John Bolton, all these factors contributed to the declining standing of the U.S. in global politics.
What is more, many people fall prey to CCP’s propaganda and its interpretations of Trump’s actions, which only enhances China’s reputation.
But that might not exactly be the case.
The CCP apparently failed to utilize the window of opportunity created by the ineptness of the Trump administration, as China could have grown to the position of a leader by filling in the void left by the U.S.
During the 2016 APEC Ministerial Meeting in Lima, Peru, Xi Jinping and his team actively supported the plans to establish the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and a Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific, or FTAAP. In contrast, the United States withdrew its signature from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in early 2017. Coupled with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB), this move bolstered China’s capacity to influence global investments and trade, high-tech mergers and acquisitions, and, overall, expand its geostrategic influence on the entire globe.
At the same time, various propaganda films about great power competition, military industry, and science and technology surged all at once, and gained remarkable following around the world.
All this provided a window of opportunity for the CCP to slowly change its course. Around the same time, the distrust for POTUS among U.S. allies’ reached its apex. According to polls conducted by the Pew Research Center, the distrust for the U.S. president in the U.K. reached 75%, 72% in Japan, 70% in Australia, and stunning 86% in France.
Had the C.C.P,. begun to open up at that time, or at least resumed the governance style of the Hu-Wen administration, it could have reaped the benefits of promoting liberalism where the U.S. failed to deliver. It was the time for Beijing to gradually enhance freedom of speech domestically, pursue sustainable infrastructural projects, gradually reform unfair barriers to trade, transform its S.O.E.s, strengthen protections for private ownership, and vitalize its start-ups and enterprises.
Moreover, were China to cease the genocide in East Turkestan and refrain from cracking down on Hong Kong's semi-autonomy, it would have greatly enhanced its global international image. Additionally, if paired with slow but steady reforms, Beijing’s respect for sovereignty of its peoples would have attracted a large amount of foreign investment, which in turn would have continued to buttress the country’s growth.
It is China prerogative to remain idle.
It might still be possible for Chinese “Dream” to come true.
Yet, a historic window of opportunity is now closed.
Xi assumed the tools of proscribing and stalling, which are completely antithetical to the aforementioned window of opportunity.
Today, China is more authoritarian, less flexible, and fully deprived of horizontal accountability. Its reliance on wolf warrior diplomacy backfired: for example, the Swedish parliament sought to expel the Chinese ambassador to Stockholm. Also, Prague, the capital of Czechia, terminated its sister-city agreement with Shanghai and instead signed a new one with Taipei. Last but not least, we ought not to forget about the recent fiasco in the relations with the United States who ordered the shutdown of China’s consulate in Houston. All of this took its toll on China’s reputation.
Its international standing and inability to replace the U.S. as the major global power are not the only issues China is currently facing.
As it experiences multiple domestic and international shocks, China struggles to combat the COVID-19 pandemic and tame the disastrous floods of Yangtze River. The swarm of locusts of biblical proportions is also crippling Beijing’s institutional capacity and may soon lead to food shortages. In fact, the precarity of food supply further diminishes the level of trust for Chinese authorities.
In 2019, the Pew Research Center conducted a public opinion survey to examine the international views of China. In the U.S., Argentina, the U.K., Canada, Germany, and Ukraine, only about 30% of respondents claim a favorable view of China.
As the COVID-19 pandemic rages in the U.S., as many as 73% of U.S. respondents view China unfavorably.
Recently, the C.C.P. is losing its focus by continuously shifting targets. In fact, I believe there is no need for the C.C.P.to rely on nationalistic appeals, since in this new century values, business relations, and fair competition are all far more important than greater than delusive blood ties.
China lies only 130 kilometers away from us. Of course, we welcome dialogue and seek to avoid misjudgments. But we also distinguish between the C.C.P. and China. While we do welcome dialogue, but we will not be coerced to talk under unjust preconditions or in fear.
The only fair prerequisites are those of reciprocity, mutual respect as well as fairness and openness with respect for the rule of law.
Source: Pew Research Center
最近看到紐約時報中文版的一篇文章
<美國的川普,中國的「川建國」>,其中一小段是這樣的
「在中國,人們戲稱川普的中文名字是川建國。那是因為建國是共產黨愛國者中一個普遍的革命人名。它在諷刺地暗示川普對美國的治理不當實際上是在鞏固習近平的政權。」
裡面也提到,川普在任的幾年,國家更分裂,對於氣候變遷,傳統美國盟友,乃至於疫情處理等都相當拙劣,對於美國傳統的自由貿易、人權等價值也基本上都沒有太大興趣。這些方針,導致美國在世界的評價降低,波頓的新書也多有描述。
除此之外,許多不幸相信中共宣傳,又或者是中共圈養的小粉紅,特別故意愛宣傳川普增強中國的威望。
但這不是真的。
中共完全沒有掌握美國做得不夠好的地方,去增強其在世界的領導力。
在2016年時,秘魯的亞太峰會舉行期間,習近平政權爭取(RCEP)及亞太自由貿易區(FTAAP)談判;對比2017年初,美國剛宣布退出TPP,加上中國到「一帶一路」和亞洲基礎設施投資銀行,中國當時在世界全面發揮投資貿易、高科技併購還有其地緣戰略的影響力。
也是那個時候,各種的大國崛起、大國軍工、大國科技的宣傳影片此起彼落,似乎正準備要在世界舞台發光發熱。
這曾經是中共慢慢轉向的一個機會之窗。彼時(2017)美國盟友對美國總統的不信任度達到歷史新高,根據皮尤研究中心的資訊,英國對於美國總統的不信任度達到75%、日本72% 澳洲70% 法國更高達86%
如果那時中共開始有限度的改革,對內放寬言論自由,或者至少維持在胡溫當時的水中,對外追求有責任的基礎建設,逐步緩慢減低不公平的貿易壁壘,對於國有企業改革,增強私營企業、新創企業的活力。
停止對新疆迫害,不干預香港自治,不僅國際形象會大幅改善,哪怕是緩慢但是穩健的改革,也會讓大量吸引外資,讓中國的活力持續前進。
哪怕是什麼都不做也好
那或許有這麽一點可能性,中國「夢」是可以前行的
但是歷史機緣的大門已經關上。
習、禁、停、放棄了這個機會之窗,徹底的走向相反的方向。
更專制、更沒有彈性,更沒有任何制衡的力量。各種戰狼外交,讓瑞典議員提案驅逐中國大使,捷克布拉格市長與台北簽訂姊妹是,就解散上海與該市關係、被美國關閉領事館、各種讓中國形象低下的事情,中共都沒有少做。
中共不但完全沒有辦法取代美國,在多重國內外的衝擊之下,又是瘟疫,又是超大水患,緊接著蝗害,還有進來的糧食不足問題,正在面臨巨大的瓶頸。
而糧食的命脈,卻恰恰又在對他最不信任,對中共價值最反對的國家聯盟
根據皮尤研究中心:Pew Research Center2019調查各國對中國的喜好度,美國、阿根廷、英國、加拿大、德國、烏克蘭等,對於中國的喜好度都在30%上下
而2020疫情後美國對於中國的不信任度,更高達73%。
最近中共在演習,又要玩轉移目標的手段,對於中共,其實不必再有民族主義的同情,因為新的世紀,價值、商業模式、公平競爭的制度大於血緣幻想。
中國離我們只有130公里的距離,我們當然歡迎對話,避免誤判。但我們同時也區分中共與中國,歡迎對話,但不在前提、條件、恐懼之下對話。
如果真的要有前提,那就是對等、尊重,還有公平公開法治的方式會晤。
資料來源:皮尤研究中心:Pew Research Center
(美國著名的民調機構和智庫機構,https://www.pewresearch.org/)
private investment中文 在 Eric's English Lounge Facebook 的最讚貼文
[時事英文]臺灣六大戰略產業
In President Tsai’s inauguration speech, it was mentioned that Taiwan will develop six core strategic industries to transform it into a critical force in the global economy. Below are the six industries and plans for developing them.
Are you ready for the development of next generation technologies?
蔡總統於就職演說時提到,臺灣將利用當前六大戰略產業的機遇,使臺灣蛻變為全球經濟的關鍵力量。以下為六大戰略產業及其發展計劃。你準備好開發下一個世代的科技了嗎?
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Six Core Strategic Industries
First, we will continue to develop our information and digital industries. We will take advantage of Taiwan's strengths in the semiconductor and ICT industries to secure a central role in global supply chains, and make Taiwan a major base for the development of next generation technologies, including IoT and AI.
1. information and digital industries 資訊與數位產業
2. semiconductor 半導體
3. ICT (Information and Communication Technology) 資訊與通訊科技
4. secure a central role 獲得一個核心地位
5. a major base 重要的基地
6. IoT (Internet of Things) 物聯網
7. AI (Artificial Intelligence) 人工智慧
六大核心戰略產業
第一,台灣要持續強化資訊及數位相關產業發展。我們要利用半導體和資通訊產業的優勢,全力搶占全球供應鏈的核心地位,讓台灣成為下一個世代,資訊科技的重要基地,全力促進物聯網和人工智慧的發展。
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Second, we are going to develop a cybersecurity industry that can integrate with 5G, digital transformation, and our national security. We will strive to create cybersecurity systems and an industrial chain that can protect our country and earn the world's trust.
8. cybersecurity industry 資安產業
9. integrate with 結合
10. digital transformation 數位轉型
第二,台灣要發展可以結合5G時代、數位轉型、以及國家安全的資安產業。我們要全力打造可以有效保護自己,也能被世界信賴的資安系統及產業鏈。
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Third, we are going to create biotech and medical technology industries integrated with the rest of the world. Throughout this pandemic, Taiwanese teams have proven that they are capable of working with world-class technologies to produce reagents and develop new drugs and vaccines. We are going to give these industries our utmost support, and transform Taiwan into a key force in the global battle against infectious diseases.
11. biotech and medical technology 生物與醫療科技
12. capable of 有能力做……
13. world-class 世界級的;世界一流的
14. reagent 試劑;試藥
15. vaccine 疫苗
16. utmost support 全力扶持;最大的支持
17. key force 關鍵力量
18. infectious diseases 傳染病
第三,我們要打造接軌全球的生物及醫療科技產業。這次疫情中,無論是試劑製造、或是新藥和疫苗的研發,「台灣團隊」都有足夠的能力,跟全球頂尖技術接軌。我們要全力扶持相關產業,讓台灣成為全球克服疫病挑戰的關鍵力量。
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Fourth, we are going to develop national defense and strategic industries by integrating military and civilian capabilities. In addition to domestically-produced naval vessel and aircraft programs that are currently underway, we will push harder to promote technological integration between the military and the private sector, to stimulate private sector production capabilities, and advance into the aviation and space industries.
19. national defense 國防
20. strategic industries 戰略產業
21. domestically-produced 國內製造
22. naval vessel 軍艦
23. underway 正在進行的;正在發生的
24. push harder 更加努力
25. technological integration 技術整合
26. stimulate 激發;刺激
27. private sector 私營部門(即民營);民間
28. the aviation and space industries 航空與太空產業
第四,我們要發展軍民整合的國防及戰略產業。除了已經在進行當中的國艦國造、國機國造,我們會更強力推動軍民技術整合,激發民間製造能量,更進一步進軍航空及太空產業。
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Fifth, we are going to accelerate the development of green energy and renewable energy industries. Over the past four years, renewable energy has experienced explosive growth, and Taiwan has become a hotspot for international investment. Building on this foundation, I am confident that we will achieve our goal of deriving 20% of our overall energy from green sources by 2025. We are going to make Taiwan a center for green energy in Asia.
29. green energy 綠能
30. renewable energy 再生能源
31. explosive growth 飛躍性地增長
32. hotspot 熱點
33. derive sth from sth 從…中得到,從…中獲得、取得
第五,我們要加速發展綠電及再生能源產業。過去四年,再生能源有飛躍性的發展,台灣成為國際再生能源投資的熱點。在這個基礎上,2025年綠能占整體能源百分之二十的目標,我有信心可以達成,台灣將成為亞太綠能中心。
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Sixth, we are going to establish strategic stockpile industries that can ensure the steady provision of critical supplies. Facing changes to the global order, we need to keep key industrial chains in Taiwan and maintain a certain degree of self-sufficiency in the production of face masks, medical and daily supplies, energy, and food.
34. strategic stockpile industries 戰略儲備產業
35. the steady provision of critical supplies 關鍵物資的穩定供應
36. the global order 全球秩序
37. key industrial chains 重要的產業鏈
38. a certain degree of 一定程度的……
39. self-sufficiency 自給自足
第六,我們還要建構足以確保關鍵物資供應的民生及戰備產業。面對未來的全球秩序變化,從口罩、醫療及民生用品、能源到糧食供應,我們要把重要的產業鏈留在國內,維持一定的自給率。
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蔡總統就職演說全文英文版:https://bit.ly/2AM9RFN
蔡總統就職演說全文中文版:https://bit.ly/36m0bxp
圖片出處:Google Search
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How might we develop these industries? What would be the first step to take?
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