關於 u.s. real gdp ，我們在網路上蒐集到這些相關的討論、資訊與評價

今天, 應該是最炫最酷的一家公司, Robinhood, 上市的一天. 它獲利了嗎? 我想沒有多少投資人會care. 最關心的, 應該是它的營收成長率, 還有股價.

在我們一直追逐科技成長股, 被他們的高營收成長率, 潛在的高報酬昏眩的時候, 會不會忘記他們醜得要命的財務報表?

而在今年, 大家追逐的這些趨勢股表現不佳的時候, 是不是也給了我們一些省思?

其實美股中, 還有很多財務報表漂亮, 但聽起來一點也不有趣(甚至很無聊)的公司, 但他們股價穩定, 長期下來, 也給了投資人很大的回報. 像之前介紹過的POOL, 過去幾年也是平均一年翻一倍的漲幅.

而在IPO中, 也有這類的好公司.

Carrier Global(CARR), 2020年4月上市的IPO, 算是工業類股, 漲了快5倍. 有在獲利. (開利冷氣應該有聽過?就是這家公司)

Academy Sports and Outdoors (ASO), 民生消費股, 也有獲利, 2020年10月上市的IPO, 目前也漲了3倍.

下面這篇文章挺好. 與大家分享. 就像文章作者所提的, 龜兔賽跑, 穩(漲)的烏龜, 不一定會輸.

也祝福大家找到&培養自己的能力圈, 穩穩獲利.

Jim Cramer: The Biggest Thing That Happened Thursday Was the Boring Stuff

No, it wasn't Robinhood or the mega-cap tech companies, it was names we depend on like Carrier Global.
By JIM CRAMER Jul 29, 2021 | 03:38 PM EDT

Stocks quotes in this article: HOOD, FB, PYPL, CARR, RTX, NUE, AGCO, ZM, ALGN, AAPL, EBAY, AMD, XLNX

One of the most glorious things I have seen involving the stock market in ages happened today.

Was it Vlad Tenev ringing the opening bell for his breakthrough, disruptive Robinhood (HOOD) , representing 22 million mostly young new investors? Was it the free-for-all decline in the stock of the "F" in FAANG, Facebook (FB) ? Or the clobbering that Paypal (PYPL) took after what looked to be a good quarter?

Nah. I was bumping into Dave Gitlin, CEO of Carrier Global (CARR) , and his charming daughter, a college student at the University of Wisconsin. They were calmly waiting for me to finish "Squawk on the Street" to say, "Hi," and I couldn't be more thrilled. Because unlike the much ballyhooed Robinhood deal, which seems like a bust, Carrier Global came public back in April 2020 at $12 and today, after tremendous earnings, not sales, but earnings, it made an all-time high at $53, after reporting a terrific number with tremendous HVAC sales, up 31%, and an earnings surprise of 55 cents vs. the 30 cents that Wall Street was expecting.

Carrier, which was spun off when United Technologies merged with Raytheon (RTX) had some tailwinds, like the need to have clean air inside, because of the pandemic and clear air outside because office buildings are responsible for 40% of carbon emissions. But the huge upside surprise and the gigantic buyback belonged to Dave and his team and I that's what I told his daughter. I made sure she knew how proud she should be about how this man made so much money for people. Twelve to 53 in 15 months time is the name of the game.

Look, I am not trying to take away from anything that Robinhood and its co-founder and CEO Vlad Tenev have created. Far from it. They have created billions for themselves and are now letting people participate in their great sales growth. You got a chance to pay a fortune per share and many Robinhoodies did, as tons of stock was allocated to the 22 million people who joined Robinhood, because of a bang up app that every young person seems to know.

I am simply saying that HVAC, yep heating, ventilation and air conditioning is one of the most boring businesses on earth and at times like today, with all of the hoopla of Robinhood it is easy to forget is how lots of money can be made being boring, and I like that. The most exciting thing that happened this year is Carrier helped provide refrigeration for vaccines. That's just fine with me.

Unlike Robinhood, Carrier hasn't brought anyone into the stock market. It's more laser-like focus on air conditioning once spun off from Raytheon means nothing to people. Just Wall Street gibberish. But you have probably walked by a Carrier machine thousands of times and never thought anything of it. Yet, you could have bought it for a song at six times earnings instead of 25 times sales.

The Carriers, with CEOs who pay themselves lavishly but perhaps not excessively, or the Nucor's (NUE) the steel company that's also well managed and sells at six times earnings, represent valuable properties, especially when the U.S. government is about to agree on a trillion dollar infrastructure bill and the country has more than 6% GDP. We don't know why they are re-opening trades or closing trades, delta-variant trades or building and bridge investments. Forgive me, though for comparing the company of Robinhood, with something that may stay special for a while vs. companies that get described as venerable, solid and built to last.

These companies are not rarities. You know people have to eat, right? You know that there would be famine without farming. So why not buy the stock of Agco (AGCO) , No. 2 farm equipment, which went from $40 to $130 in a year and a half without ever being expensive. Combines too boring? Again fine with me. Now that the masks are off -- or at least in some places, although Zoom (ZM) is still crushing it -- I, like many others, including my daughter, didn't like how her teeth looked even as, to me, they were perfect. Dentists tell you to get Align (ALGN) . I wanted them on "Mad Money" but the show was just too darned jammed. The stock's up the most in the S&P 500, with a product that, again, like the Purloined Letter, is right in front of you.

I love tech. Created the term FANG, added the "A" when it was clear that Apple (AAPL) had to take the acronymic stage between another "A" and an "N." I am proud that those who bet against me on Twitter, the legion, are betting against FAANG. I wrote obituaries for a goodly time in my career as a reporter but I never wrote as many as have been penned to talk about the group has already made the ultimate measure on behalf of shareholders.

Oh and it's not like I don't like tech or fin tech. I felt the slings and arrows of Facebook and PayPal today. Facebook's management once again lowered the boom on its future talking about real deceleration in growth. I thought it was too dire. PayPal's Dan Schulman talked about how the separation with its former partner, eBay (EBAY) gets done now and earnings will be hurt. This was one of the least revelatory surprises ever. I think both are practicing UPOD, Underpromising to Overdeliver, and, sure this time might be different, but it's sure been the way they have handled it in the past.

Far better to be in the straight out blow outs like Advance Micro (AMD) which had still one more banner day, this time because the company it is buying, the dowdy Xilinx (XLNX) , a sleepy semiconductor company, had tremendous earnings. The two together could be unassailable and even as AMD is now richly valued it is deservingly so.

I can't wait to hear Vlad Tenev's reflection on Robinhood's debut as a public company and about the novel offering that gave millions of shares to his clients. Vlad's not so much a rags to riches American story. He's a poor Bulgarian to insanely rich American because of his on ingenuity. That's a story with celebrating in itself.

I am simply pointing out that unlike Vlad, whom you would have had invested with when you weren't allowed or able to, Dave Gitlin sure didn't keep you out of the better bet, the stock of HVAC king Carrier.

You did.

【 黎安友專文 l 中國如何看待香港危機 】

美國哥倫比亞大學的資深中國通黎安友（Andrew Nathan）教授最近在《外交事務》（Foreign Affairs）雜誌的專文，值得一看。

黎安友是台灣許多中國研究學者的前輩級老師，小英總統去哥大演講時，正是他積極促成。小英在美國的僑宴，黎安友也是座上賓。

這篇文章的標題是：「中國如何看待香港危機：北京自我克制背後的真正原因」。

文章很長，而且用英文寫，需要花點時間閱讀。大家有空可以看看。

Andrew這篇文章的立論基礎，是來自北京核心圈的匿名說法。以他在學術界的地位，我相信他對消息來源已經做了足夠的事實查核或確認。

這篇文章，是在回答一個疑問：中共為何在香港事件如此自制？有人說是怕西方譴責，有人說是怕損害香港的金融地位。

都不是。這篇文章認為，上述兩者都不是中共的真實顧慮。

無論你多痛恨中共，你都必須真實面對你的敵人。

中共是搞經濟階級鬥爭起家的，當年用階級鬥爭打敗國民黨。而現在，中共正用這樣的思維處理香港議題。

文章有一句話：“China’s response has been rooted not in anxiety but in confidence.” 這句話道盡階級鬥爭的精髓。

中共一點都不焦慮。相反地，中共很有自信，香港的菁英階級及既得利益的收編群體，到最後會支持中共。

這個分化的心理基礎，來自經濟上的利益。

文中還提到，鄧小平當年給香港五十年的一國兩制，就是為了「給香港足夠的時間適應中共的政治系統」。

1997年，香港的GDP佔中國的18%。2018年，這個比例降到2.8%。

今日的香港經濟，在中共的評估，是香港需要中國，而不是中國需要香港。

中共正在在意的，是香港的高房價問題。香港的房價，在過去十年內三倍翻漲。

文章是這樣描述：
“Housing prices have tripled over the past decade; today, the median price of a house is more than 20 times the median gross annual household income. The median rent has increased by nearly 25 percent in the past six years. As many as 250,000 people are waiting for public housing. At the same time, income growth for many Hong Kong residents has fallen below the overall increase in cost of living.”

無論你同不同意這些說法，都請你試圖客觀地看看這篇文章。

有趣的是，黎安友在文章中部分論點引述了他的消息來源（但他並沒有加上個人評論），部分是他自己的觀察。

#護台胖犬劉仕傑
Instagram: old_dog_chasing_ball

新書：《 我在外交部工作 》

**

黎安友原文：

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-09-30/how-china-sees-hong-kong-crisis?fbclid=IwAR2PwHns5gWrw0fT0sa5LuO8zgv4PhLmkYfegtBgoOMCD3WJFI3w5NTe0S4

How China Sees the Hong Kong Crisis
The Real Reasons Behind Beijing’s Restraint

By Andrew J. Nathan September 30, 2019

Massive and sometimes violent protests have rocked Hong Kong for over 100 days. Demonstrators have put forward five demands, of which the most radical is a call for free, direct elections of Hong Kong’s chief executive and all members of the territory’s legislature: in other words, a fully democratic system of local rule, one not controlled by Beijing. As this brazen challenge to Chinese sovereignty has played out, Beijing has made a show of amassing paramilitary forces just across the border in Shenzhen. So far, however, China has not deployed force to quell the unrest and top Chinese leaders have refrained from making public threats to do so.

Western observers who remember the violent crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators in Tiananmen Square 30 years ago have been puzzled by Beijing’s forbearance. Some have attributed Beijing’s restraint to a fear of Western condemnation if China uses force. Others have pointed to Beijing’s concern that a crackdown would damage Hong Kong’s role as a financial center for China.

But according to two Chinese scholars who have connections to regime insiders and who requested anonymity to discuss the thinking of policymakers in Beijing, China’s response has been rooted not in anxiety but in confidence. Beijing is convinced that Hong Kong’s elites and a substantial part of the public do not support the demonstrators and that what truly ails the territory are economic problems rather than political ones—in particular, a combination of stagnant incomes and rising rents. Beijing also believes that, despite the appearance of disorder, its grip on Hong Kong society remains firm. The Chinese Communist Party has long cultivated the territory’s business elites (the so-called tycoons) by offering them favorable economic access to the mainland. The party also maintains a long-standing loyal cadre of underground members in the territory. And China has forged ties with the Hong Kong labor movement and some sections of its criminal underground. Finally, Beijing believes that many ordinary citizens are fearful of change and tired of the disruption caused by the demonstrations.

Beijing therefore thinks that its local allies will stand firm and that the demonstrations will gradually lose public support and eventually die out. As the demonstrations shrink, some frustrated activists will engage in further violence, and that in turn will accelerate the movement’s decline. Meanwhile, Beijing is turning its attention to economic development projects that it believes will address some of the underlying grievances that led many people to take to the streets in the first place.

This view of the situation is held by those at the very top of the regime in Beijing, as evidenced by recent remarks made by Chinese President Xi Jinping, some of which have not been previously reported. In a speech Xi delivered in early September to a new class of rising political stars at the Central Party School in Beijing, he rejected the suggestion of some officials that China should declare a state of emergency in Hong Kong and send in the People’s Liberation Army. “That would be going down a political road of no return,” Xi said. “The central government will exercise the most patience and restraint and allow the [regional government] and the local police force to resolve the crisis.” In separate remarks that Xi made around the same time, he spelled out what he sees as the proper way to proceed: “Economic development is the only golden key to resolving all sorts of problems facing Hong Kong today.”

ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS, MANY QUESTIONS

Chinese decision-makers are hardly surprised that Hong Kong is chafing under their rule. Beijing believes it has treated Hong Kong with a light hand and has supported the territory’s economy in many ways, especially by granting it special access to the mainland’s stocks and currency markets, exempting it from the taxes and fees that other Chinese provinces and municipalities pay the central government, and guaranteeing a reliable supply of water, electricity, gas, and food. Even so, Beijing considers disaffection among Hong Kong’s residents a natural outgrowth of the territory’s colonial British past and also a result of the continuing influence of Western values. Indeed, during the 1984 negotiations between China and the United Kingdom over Hong Kong’s future, the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping suggested following the approach of “one country, two systems” for 50 years precisely to give people in Hong Kong plenty of time to get used to the Chinese political system.

But “one country, two systems” was never intended to result in Hong Kong spinning out of China’s control. Under the Basic Law that China crafted as Hong Kong’s “mini-constitution,” Beijing retained the right to prevent any challenge to what it considered its core security interests. The law empowered Beijing to determine if and when Hong Kongers could directly elect the territory’s leadership, allowed Beijing to veto laws passed by the Hong Kong Legislative Council, and granted China the right to make final interpretations of the Basic Law. And there would be no question about who had a monopoly of force. During the negotiations with the United Kingdom, Deng publicly rebuked a top Chinese defense official—General Geng Biao, who at the time was a patron of a rising young official named Xi Jinping—for suggesting that there might not be any need to put troops in Hong Kong. Deng insisted that a Chinese garrison was necessary to symbolize Chinese sovereignty.

Statements made by U.S. politicians in support of the recent demonstrations only confirm Beijing’s belief that Washington seeks to inflame radical sentiments in Hong Kong.

At first, Hong Kongers seemed to accept their new role as citizens of a rising China. In 1997, in a tracking poll of Hong Kong residents regularly conducted by researchers at the University of Hong Kong, 47 percent of respondents identified themselves as “proud” citizens of China. But things went downhill from there. In 2012, the Hong Kong government tried to introduce “patriotic education” in elementary and middle schools, but the proposed curriculum ran into a storm of local opposition and had to be withdrawn. In 2014, the 79-day Umbrella Movement brought hundreds of thousands of citizens into the streets to protest Beijing’s refusal to allow direct elections for the chief executive. And as authoritarianism has intensified under Xi’s rule, events such as the 2015 kidnapping of five Hong Kong–based publishers to stand trial in the mainland further soured Hong Kong opinion. By this past June, only 27 percent of respondents to the tracking poll described themselves as “proud” to be citizens of China. This year’s demonstrations started as a protest against a proposed law that would have allowed Hong Kongers suspected of criminal wrongdoing to be extradited to the mainland but then developed into a broad-based expression of discontent over the lack of democratic accountability, police brutality, and, most fundamentally, what was perceived as a mainland assault on Hong Kong’s unique identity.

Still, Chinese leaders do not blame themselves for these shifts in public opinion. Rather, they believe that Western powers, especially the United States, have sought to drive a wedge between Hong Kong and the mainland. Statements made by U.S. politicians in support of the recent demonstrations only confirm Beijing’s belief that Washington seeks to inflame radical sentiments in Hong Kong. As Xi explained in his speech in September:
As extreme elements in Hong Kong turn more and more violent, Western forces, especially the United States, have been increasingly open in their involvement. Some extreme anti-China forces in the United States are trying to turn Hong Kong into the battleground for U.S.-Chinese rivalry…. They want to turn Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy into de facto independence, with the ultimate objective to contain China's rise and prevent the revival of the great Chinese nation.

Chinese leaders do not fear that a crackdown on Hong Kong would inspire Western antagonism. Rather, they take such antagonism as a preexisting reality—one that goes a long way toward explaining why the disorder in Hong Kong broke out in the first place. In Beijing’s eyes, Western hostility is rooted in the mere fact of China’s rise, and thus there is no use in tailoring China’s Hong Kong strategy to influence how Western powers would respond.

IT’S NOT ABOUT THE BENJAMINS

The view that Xi has not deployed troops because of Hong Kong’s economic importance to the mainland is also misguided, and relies on an outdated view of the balance of economic power. In 1997, Hong Kong’s GDP was equivalent to 18 percent of the mainland’s. Most of China’s foreign trade was conducted through Hong Kong, providing China with badly needed hard currencies. Chinese companies raised most of their capital on the Hong Kong stock exchange. Today, things are vastly different. In 2018, Hong Kong’s GDP was equal to only 2.7 percent of the mainland’s. Shenzhen alone has overtaken Hong Kong in terms of GDP. Less than 12 percent of China’s exports now flow through Hong Kong. The combined market value of China’s domestic stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen far surpasses that of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, and Chinese companies can also list in Frankfurt, London, New York, and elsewhere.

Although Hong Kong remains the largest offshore clearing center for renminbi, that role could easily be filled by London or Singapore, if Chinese leaders so desired.
Investment flowing into and out of China still tends to pass through financial holding vehicles set up in Hong Kong, in order to benefit from the region’s legal protections. But China’s new foreign investment law (which will take effect on January 1, 2020) and other recent policy changes mean that such investment will soon be able to bypass Hong Kong. And although Hong Kong remains the largest offshore clearing center for renminbi, that role could easily be filled by London or Singapore, if Chinese leaders so desired.

Wrecking Hong Kong’s economy by using military force to impose emergency rule would not be a good thing for China. But the negative effect on the mainland’s prosperity would not be strong enough to prevent Beijing from doing whatever it believes is necessary to maintain control over the territory.

CAN’T BUY ME LOVE?

As it waits out the current crisis, Beijing has already started tackling the economic problems that it believes are the source of much of the anger among Hong Kongers. Housing prices have tripled over the past decade; today, the median price of a house is more than 20 times the median gross annual household income. The median rent has increased by nearly 25 percent in the past six years. As many as 250,000 people are waiting for public housing. At the same time, income growth for many Hong Kong residents has fallen below the overall increase in cost of living.

⭐ 明年真的可以發大財嗎？⭐　
　　　　　　
本院經濟所發布2019年臺灣經濟情勢預測結果：
　　　　
我國出口需求及消費動能相對減弱，第三季實質GDP年成長率僅達2.27%，預期2018年經濟成長率將微幅調降為2.64%。展望2019年，全球經濟前景仍因貿易戰紛擾與中國需求放緩，加以美國減稅政策效應遞減，以及金融情勢轉趨緊縮，全球經濟成長動能將有所趨緩。

預估2019年實質經濟成長率為2.45%📊

💰物價：1至10月的消費者物價指數(CPI)較去年同期成長1.60%，核心消費者物價指數於相同期間則為1.34%，顯示物價仍相對穩定。

💱貨幣供給：10月雖受股災衝擊而使國內資金需求下滑，然累計前10個月M1B及M2年增率分別為5.30%及3.60%，顯示市場資金仍呈適度寬鬆。

👥勞動市場：今年前10個月之平均失業率為3.71%，顯示就業情況良好，情勢穩定。

國際情勢不明的情況下，我國政府積極推動重大公共工程建設、促進投資及強化內需產業發展等擴張性財政政策之實質效果，將成為臺灣經濟成長動能是否延續的重要關鍵。
　　
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Due to the heating up of China-U.S. trade conflict and more dramatic fluctuations in international financial markets, the pace of expansion in the global economy has shown instability and the downside risk is gradually getting realized, suppressing the growth momentum. Whist the U.S. economic performance is strong, growth of other major advanced economies such as Europe and Japan are not as strong as anticipated.
　　　　
The slowdown in China's economic growth partly due to the trade war is resulting in weak demand in both export and domestic markets. As for Taiwan, the real GDP grew by 2.27% (year-on-year) in the third quarter of 2018 as consumption weakened and export markets were affected adversely by the trade war.
　　　　
Therefore, the revised estimate of economic growth rate in 2018 is 2.64%. Looking forward to 2019, the global economic outlook is still suffering from the risk of trade wars, slowdown in China's demand, diminishing effects of the U.S. tax cuts and a tightening in financial markets, implying the global growth momentum will continue to slow. We expect the real GDP growth of 2.45% in 2019.

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中文新聞稿：https://www.sinica.edu.tw/ch/news/6076
English: https://www.sinica.edu.tw/en/news/6076