關於 two decades 中文 ，我們在網路上蒐集到這些相關的討論、資訊與評價

張忠謀對半導體供應鏈在地化的致詞引起矚目，我將全文的翻譯，分享給大家：

張忠謀APEC非正式領袖會議致詞全文：（中文在後）

This Informal Retreat has been called to discuss how Asia-Pacific can collaborate to move through the COVID health crisis, and to accelerate the post-COVID economic recovery. Chinese Taipei will address these two topics specifically.
On COVID-19, Chinese Taipei has had an excellent record so far. With a population of 23 million, over the last year and half, and in spite of a recent surge which has now abated, we have had a total of about fifteen thousand infected cases (.07% of the population), and 763 deaths (3 out of one hundred thousand).
We believe that our experience and know-how gained can help other APEC members. We have been, and continue to be willing to help. We have donated masks and other medical supplies to other APEC members in the past and are ready and willing to share our anti-COVID-19 know-how with you.
At the same time, WE NEED HELP! Our vaccination coverage at present is less than 20%. Although the U.S. and Japan have been generous in donating vaccines to us, and our private institutions have succeeded in procuring ten million doses of vaccines, we still need more vaccines, and need them sooner! Most other APEC members need help as well. We must ask for help from the APEC members that possess and produce more vaccines than they themselves need.
On re-vitalizing Post-COVID economy, Chinese Taipei urges free trade among APEC members and in the world, after giving consideration to vital national security needs.
In the past seven decades, free trade has enabled vibrant growth in most APEC economies. Free trade is merely a way in which each APEC economy contributes its own competitive advantage and every APEC member benefits.
Recently, however, we note with concern the tendency to want self-sufficiency or “on-shoring” of semiconductor chips. We must point out that in the past many decades free trade has greatly helped the advance of semiconductor technology. In turn, the ever greater complexity of the technology has caused the supply chain to go “off-shore”.
It would be highly impractical to try to turn back the clock. If it is tried, cost will go up and technology advance may slow. What may happen is that after hundreds of billions and many years have been spent, the result will still be a not-quite-self-sufficient, and high-cost supply chain.
We do recognize national security concerns, and believe that for security applications, a self-sufficient supply chain within one’s own borders is prudent. However, for the much larger civilian market, a supply chain substantially based on free trade system is by far the best approach.
In summary, on COVID-19, Chinese Taipei can help, is ready and willing to help with its know-how, but also needs more vaccines sooner, along with many other APEC members. On Post-COVID economic re-vitalization, Chinese Taipei urges free trade, after giving consideration to vital national security concerns.

（中文翻譯）

此次非正式領袖會議召開的目的是討論亞太地區應如何合作以度過新型冠狀病毒（COVID-19）疫情危機，並加速疫後經濟復甦。中華台北將就這兩個議題表達看法。
面對新型冠狀病毒（COVID-19）疫情，中華台北迄今維持傑出防疫紀錄。我們有兩千三百萬人口，儘管近期疫情曾一度升溫，但目前業已趨緩，在過去超過一年半的時間中，總確診病例數約為一萬五千例（佔總人口0.07%），其中死亡病例數為763例（約為十萬分之三）。
相信我們在過程中得到的經驗與知識能夠協助其他APEC成員。我們持續地願意提供協助。過去我們曾捐贈口罩與其他醫療物資予其他APEC成員，現在也準備好與你們分享我們抗疫的知識。
同時，我們也需要幫助！目前我們的疫苗注射覆蓋率低於20%。雖然美國與日本已慷慨捐贈疫苗，我們的民間機構也已成功採購一千萬劑，我們仍然需要更多數量的疫苗，而且需要儘快取得！其他多數的APEC成員也需要幫助。我們需要向目前擁有並生產超過他們自身所需疫苗數量的APEC成員尋求協助。
針對疫後經濟復甦，中華台北敦促APEC成員，在考慮重要國家安全需求後，彼此間及與全球進行自由貿易。
在過去70年，自由貿易使多數APEC經濟體蓬勃發展。自由貿易僅是各APEC經濟體貢獻自己的競爭優勢，而其他APEC成員藉此受惠的方法。
然而近來，我們很關切要求「境內」半導體晶片自給自足的趨勢。我們必需指出，過去數十年的自由貿易大幅促進半導體技術發展。因此，越趨複雜的技術致使供應鏈走向「境外」。
試圖讓時光倒流是相當不切實際的，如果嘗試讓時光倒流，不僅成本將會提升以及技術的進步可能放緩。在花費了數千億與許多年的時間之後，結果仍將是無法充分自給自足且成本很高的供應鏈。
我們認同國家安全的顧慮確實存在，也相信針對國安應用，在國境內存有一個能夠自給自足的供應鏈是審慎的作法。然而，針對規模大得許多的民間市場，一個基於自由貿易體系的供應鏈是最好的作法。
總結來說，針對新型冠狀病毒（COVID-19）疫情，中華台北能夠協助，我們也願意、並準備好以自身的知識與經驗提供協助，但也和其他許多APEC成員一樣，需要儘快取得更多疫苗。關於疫後經濟復甦，中華台北敦促在考慮關鍵國家安全需求後，應該採取自由貿易。

【After Winning Majority in LegCo: Beijing's Crackdown May Trigger International Intervention】

***感謝Hong Kong Columns - Translated，將我早前撰寫『議會過半想像：以「#國際攬炒」反制「臨立會2.0」』長文（https://www.facebook.com/joshuawongchifung/photos/a.313299448762570/2887650867994069/）翻譯成英文，鼓勵國際社會關注立會選舉一旦過半的沙盤推演，在最惡劣形勢下的制衡策略。***

中文精簡版本：https://www.facebook.com/joshuawongchifung/photos/a.564294826996363/2888641404561682/

Hongkongers have experienced our revolution for over half a year. They no longer take a consequentialist view to the effectiveness of their movement as they did years ago, or waste time second-guessing the intentions and background of fellow activists. Following the defensive battles at CUHK and PolyU, November’s District Council election saw a great victory of unity. More marvellous is the union between peaceful and “valiant” protesters.

In the process of resisting tyranny, the people have realised that one cannot prioritize one strategy over another. This is also how the common goal of “35+” came into being—the hope that we will win over half of the seats in the Legislative Council (LegCo) this September, such that the political spectrum that represents the majority of Hongkongers is able to gain control of legislative decisions. The political clout of Hongkongers will increase if 35 or more seats are successfully secured on our side. It is certainly one vital step to achieve the five demands within the system.

The possibility of realizing legislative majority

Technically it is not unrealistic to win a majority even under the current undemocratic system. Back in the 2016 LegCo election, we already won 30 seats. In addition to the District Council (First) functional constituency seat that is already in the pocket of the pan-democrats, as long as the candidates in Kowloon East and New Territories West do not start infighting again, we could safely secure 33 seats based on the number of pan-dem votes in 2016.

The other 3 seats required to achieve a majority depend on democrats’ breakthrough among the functional constituencies by dispersing the resources of the Liaison Office. They also count on whether the turnout this September could exceed 71.2% — that of last year’s District Council elections. Some of the factors that could affect the turnout include: will the epidemic persist into the summer? Will there be potential violent repression of protests in the 2 weeks preceding the election? Will Hong Kong-US relations be affected by the downturn of the global economy?

Therefore, the ambition of “35+” is to be prioritised by the resistance as both a means and an end. I have already expressed my support for an intra-party primary at the coordination meeting. In the meantime, it is pleasing to see the ongoing debates reaching a consensus of maximising the seats among geographical constituencies in the upcoming election.

Whilst enthusiastic coordination, we should also assess the post-election landscape and gauge Beijing’s reactions: if we do not reach 35 seats, Hong Kong will be subject to tighter control and more severe repression by China; but if the democratic parties successfully form a majority in LegCo, CCP’s fears of a “constitutional crisis” would become imminent. Hence, the key questions are how the Pan-Democrats should deal with the volatile political situation in Hong Kong and how they are going to meet Beijing’s charge head-on.

Watching out for Beijing’s dismissal of LegCo after reaching majority

To take back control of LegCo such that it faithfully reflects the majority’s principles and needs is the definition of a healthy democracy. Recently, however, DAB’s Tam Yiu-chung has warned that the plan of the Pan-Dems to “usurp power” in the LegCo would only lead to Beijing’s forceful disqualification of certain members or the interpretation of the Basic Law. This proves that winning a majority in LegCo is not only a popular conception but also a realistic challenge that would get on the nerves of Beijing. Could Beijing accept a President James To in LegCo? These unknown variables must be addressed upon achieving a majority.

While there is no telltale sign as to Beijing’s exact strategy, we are already familiar with the way CCP manipulated the Basic Law in the past 4 years. Having experienced three waves of disqualifications in LegCo, twice kicked out of LegCo with my team, and thrice locked up in jail, I have no false hopes of an easy compromise from Beijing: they would not let Pan-Dems control LegCo for half a year and wait (as is the proper procedure) until after having negatived the Budget to dissolve the legislature, and thereby giving them an easy victory in the re-elections. The greater the Pan-Dems threaten Beijing’s rule in Hong Kong, the more likely that it will trigger Beijing’s repression.

Since the disqualification and arrest of lawmakers have already become “normalised”, one can even imagine the police stepping into the LegCo building to force Pan-Dems into voting. Neither is it beyond our imagination to expect the CCP to kick out all 70 lawmakers in a fit of rage and replace them with a provisional LegCo “2.0” [HKCT note: The first was from 25 Jan 1997 to 30 Jun 1998]. To depend on a majority that could lead to a chapter of a “new testament” for One Country, Two Systems is perhaps what many elites long for, but they are overly optimistic:for a ticket to the promised land will not be available at the Chief Executive election campaign a year and a half later.

Admittedly, the Pan-Dems cannot unilaterally initiate “Laam-chaau” [HKCT note: mostly translated into “scorched-earth” mentality or “mutual destruction”; some even translated into “If I burn, you burn with us”]. The most they can do is to force a standstill of the government, and not for long the LegCo will have been eliminated from the equation to make the wheels turn again. It all leaves the plan of “Negativing the motion → Dissolving LegCo → Re-election after re-election → the stepping down of Carrie Lam” merely as overly positive speculation, probably resulting from their overestimate of CCP's capacity for rational calculation. The Pan-Dems must guard their frontlines and recognise what the biggest threat from Hong Kong to China could be. In this case, should LegCo sessions be disrupted or suspended, the Pan-Dems would have to be well prepared to surmount the expected obstacles and prevent the disqualification crisis 4 years ago—a Catch-22 indeed.

Productive tension from global intervention: Using Laam-chaau against the CCP

What aggravates the CCP the most is the potential threat to Hong Kong’s unique status as the one and only “separate customs territory”. Any miscalculation will compromise its role as the Chinese economy’s “white gloves”. Imagine if CCP were to disqualify all 70 elected lawmakers and convene a meeting north of the Shenzhen River to pass a resolution to Hong Kong’s affairs (much like the Provisional Legislative Council “1.0" in 1997), how great will the shock be in a world with an effective Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act? However hard it is to predict the future one thing is certain: With the US presidential election just around the corner, blows to the separation of powers would not be tolerated, and the West would necessarily effect countermeasures against the Hong Kong government.

Beijing has been relying upon Hong Kong to navigate the international community for decades. While clamping down on the political freedom of the cosmopolitan city, Beijing desires to maintain the financial centre’s economic freedom. Hence, we started lobbying for the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act four years ago, and today we are determined to promote “Laam-chaau” on an international scale.

The will of the voters must be reflected in an election. If a “35+” legislature were to be dismissed and replaced, such flagrant violation of democracy would assuredly cause a greater backlash than the infamous extradition bill. Knowing what the reality ahead of us could be, we have to combine our election and international strategies to oppose the placement of a 35+ LegCo with an “Emergency Legislative Council 2.0”, to advance an international “Laam-chaau” to Hong Kong’s status as “separate customs territory”. Only then will we stand a chance to resist the regime and to realise the five demands.

Adjusting our mindset: Overcoming the “constitutional crisis” to reach a resolution

Upon the realization of the “35+” LegCo, it is expected that the CCP will launch a devastating counterattack. The Pan-Dems should not expect LegCo to run normally; neither can the lawmakers realise their governing blueprints they have for Hong Kong. Rather, candidates will be able to compete against one another with visions of a liberated Hong Kong through popular vote. Bringing this point up has nothing to do with undermining the common goal of reaching a majority in LegCo, but rather channels the battle of LegCo to positive use upon the rule of law’s death and a “constitutional crisis” ahead. Knowing that Hongkongers have nothing to fall back on, all Pan-Dems should not miss the only way to the realization of “35+”.

Thus, be they partisans, nonpartisans, incumbent politicians, amateur politicians, or the civil society as a whole – if we stay in the political discourse of 2016 and continue to perpetuate old stereotypes, that is to deal with the divisions on the pan-democratic camp by favouring the most “local” faction; to consider only resource allocation and self-aggrandizement as the purpose of a LegCo campaign; to ignore how potential lawmakers are fitted to what specific roles; to turn a blind eye to the journey of resistance since last summer (extending indefinitely into the future)—They would lead as astray and cost us lose a precious opportunity for change by winning a 35+ majority.

The extent to which the pan-democrats can stay united in light of the political atmosphere since last summer is another problem that our side must to address. Before the watershed moment of 12th June 2019, many democratic delegates were trapped in the mentality of needing to “preserve people’s livelihood”, “be content of what we have accomplished”, and other strategies that favours stability. As the government refuses to heed to the five demands, whether the democrats, especially those in the functional constituencies, have the political will to go all-in is the real difficult question that confronts us in the upcoming LegCo election.

All in all, if “35+” cannot be realised, it is unsurprising to see LegCo being more heavily suppressed in the next 4 years; even if "35+" is achieved, it is questionable whether the pan-democrats are able to weather multiple attacks, verbal or physical, from the regime (judging from its power in the last four years) and utilise the international Laam-chaau strategy against the displacement of LegCo. Adhering to the motto of “we fight on, each in his own way”, I can only hope that Hongkongers in elections, street confrontations and international front can reconcile with each other, so that we may collectively compel the government to yield to our demands in the next six months. It is only by reaching a resolution before a real constitutional crisis that we can combat the institutional violence of the regime and not be devoured by it.

https://hkcolumn.blogspot.com/2020/04/joshua-wong-after-winning-majority-in.html?fbclid=IwAR216gf53pG_j9JOpDfr2GItvjLfrFSekKTPzoEs3-s9KBqvPEwz865P8vw

One of my most memorable work in 2019 is Experience Macao - SG, Macao Tourism Malaysia.

Since my last visit to Macao in 1995 (almost 25 years ago), I never thought that Macao would have changed so much over the past two decades! Besides what many people know Macao as the "game" city, this tiny city in the Southern part of China has so much to offer. Entertainment, history, food, culture, sports, & Instagrammable spots there are many surprises in every corners of the city.

Thank you CCTV 中文 for the special feature in this episode. As mentioned in the press, I will be back! :-)

There will be more adventures in 2020... stay tuned...

Read more about the story: https://www.travelinspiration360.com/greater-bay-area-travel/

Full Episode (Video Source): https://www.facebook.com/761870613900500/posts/3164312703656267/

Keith Yuen
#travelinspiration360 #澳門二十年 #cctv4 #央视 #macao25