關於 public housing rent ，我們在網路上蒐集到這些相關的討論、資訊與評價

網上又有「藍能否變黃」的第N回討論。其實當然有成功例子啦。

被催淚彈殻射到爆缸仍記掛著翌日能否帶女友和未來外母去旅行。這是個可歌可泣的愛情故事。

Crowdfunding for the project《Wounds of Hong Kong 港傷》https://bit.ly/2WuNqw2
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*for English please scroll down

雄仔（化名） 護士 31歲

2019年11月8日深夜，雄仔與女朋友路過旺角惠豐中心，遇上市民與防暴警對峙。他倆看見警察有異動，正想離開現場，但警方已開始發射催淚彈。彈殻擦過雄仔的頭部，即時血流如注，留下3cm的縫針疤痕。

「講起就激氣（光火），在前線受傷我反而開心。」當時旺角街頭有防暴警察列陣，市民向他們叫罵，「都係『撚狗』（調侃警察）。」然而「撚狗」會令警察暴怒，繼而報復，「現在他們把催淚彈當子彈用啦。」雄仔褂彩，同為護士的女朋友嚇得哭了，但他仍然冷靜，心想：「仆街了（靠）！明天還能飛嗎？」

因為參與抗爭，加上工時長，雄仔自6月以來都沒有好好陪伴女朋友，「她也是黃絲，覺得不應該拿這些事來詐型（發難），藏在心裏，但你會感受到她的不滿。」計劃已久的小旅行算是補償，還要帶著未來外母同遊，「始終是女孩，需要陪伴、關心，要有拍拖活動。」他去醫院縫針後，翌日按計劃出發。

雄仔的女友和家人知道他有上街遊行，卻不知道他是「家長」，助養了9名只有10幾歲的「子女」。8月18日的大型遊行，他到達終點後轉入夏愨道，看看有何事發生，「有人呼召社工，有個小朋友在哭、嚷著要自殺，因為屋企是藍絲。我想，我應該可以幫忙。」雄仔就此成為「家長」。子女又介紹其他子女，漸漸膝下承歡。

除了提供情緒支援，雄仔也為子女提供零用錢，「『文具』 好貴，我常叫他們以安全為先，有事就棄裝，再買過。」「仔女都好生性。要把塞錢偷偷攝入gear(抗爭裝備)，怕他們不肯要。」「文具」就是防毒面具和濾罐，每套大約1000港元，「我有工作，可以撐住，只是花了積蓄，對不起女友啦。」至今他已花了6、7萬元在子女身上，「她知道我花了1000元都肉赤到死（心疼得要死），怎敢跟她說？」

需要接濟的少年很多來自建制家庭，因為政見而被斷糧草、甚至斷六親。 若雄仔晚生十幾年，他很可能是其中之一，「我爸是紅底。自細他就跟我說票投民建聯（親北京政黨），不然就脫離父子關係。」2016年立法會新界東補選，他仍是投民建聯的周浩鼎，2014年雨傘運動當然沒有參與，「之前的抗爭關於政制，可能我未感受到對人生自由有重大威脅。實行雙普選需要時間，香港社會始終未成熟。」直到政府強推《逃犯條例》修訂，他才感到刀刃在脖子上，「明明是一國兩制， 可以引渡逃犯，就會造成破窗。事事都要跟大陸接軌，要引入計分制（社會信用評分制度）嗎？」怕中港區隔蕩然無存。

在2019年11月的區議會選舉，雄仔首次「倒戈」，「大氣候是分顏色（政治立場）投票。我也不相信泛民主派，不信有救世主，但我就是要建制派輸。雖然我仍然覺以地區事務而言，建制派做到的比反對派多。」因為官僚樂於賣人情予建制派。雄仔有個親戚曾購買私煙，遇著海關放蛇，因為數量頗多，有轉售的嫌疑，房屋署以從事非法勾當為理由，想收回他的公屋單位。後來由建制派區議員出面求情，才得以過關，「如果找泛民議員幫手，房署不會給他面子。」

雄仔與家人住在狹小的公屋單位，因為要收藏大量「文具」，近月已搬到朋友家中。他與女友關係穩定，卻未想過同居，「租金貴，如果可以搬出來，就可以結婚啦。」「我女友很依賴、很需要照顧。待這件事（抗爭）完結再談吧，不然應付不了。她去旅行連目的地都不知道，帶行李去機場就是了。我計劃好行程，她便跟著我走。」

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Hung（alias） 31 years old Nurse

In the middle of the night of November 8th, 2019, Hung and his girlfriend passed by Wai Fung Plaza in Mongkok and stumbled upon a confrontation between citizens and the riot police. The police fired tear gas bombs when the two started to leave. Hung was hit by a bullet case on his head, leaving a three-centimeter long scar.

“I get so mad every time I talk about this incident. It would have been worthwhile if I was injured at the frontline in a protest,” said Hung. At the time, there were riot police on the streets of Mong Kok. The public was yelling and having arguments with them. That made the police angry, so they retaliated. “Nowadays, the riot police use tear gas bombs as bullets,” said Hung. Hung’s girlfriend, a nurse, was crying from fear when he was hit. However, Hung was calm, only worrying about if he would need to cancel their trip for the day after.

Because of his participation in protests and long working hours, Hung hadn’t spent much time with his girlfriend since June. “She is also a pro-democracy supporter so she understands and never complains, but I knew she was upset about me not spending enough time with her. The get-away trip we had planned was considered to be ‘compensation’ for her. We were also taking my future mother-in-law with us. As a girl, I understand she wants company, care, and time from her boyfriend,” said Hung. After getting stitches at the hospital for his wound, Hung went on the trip.

Hung’s girlfriend and his family know that he participates in protests, but they don’t know he is also a “parent” who helps “raise” 9 teenagers. On the protest on August 18th, he was at Harcourt Road after the end of the protest. He heard someone calling for a social worker. A kid was crying and saying he wanted to commit suicide because his parents are pro-establishment supporters. Hung thought he could do something to help. That’s how he became a “parent” and ended up helping more kids.

In addition to providing emotional support, Hung also helps them financially by giving them money. “ ‘Stationery’ is expensive. I always remind them that safety is the first priority. They should leave their gear behind if they need to run. They can always repurchase their gear. These are good kids, and they don’t always accept my offers, so I need to secretly hide money into their gear for them,” said Hung. The ‘stationery’ is actually protective gear like gas masks and filter canisters. Each set costs approximately HK$1,000. “I have a job, so I can afford them. I spent my savings, so it made me feel bad for my girlfriend, as I didn’t tell her exactly how much I had spent on the kids,” said Hung. Until now, Hung had already spent over HK$60,000 to HK$70,000.

Most of the kids Hung helps are from pro-establishment families. Having different political views, these kids don’t get support from their families and are left with no money and no place to stay. Hung thinks if he were born ten years later, he could have been one of these kids. “My father is an extreme Beijing-backed establishment supporter. He has told me to vote for Democratic Alliance for the Betterment (DAB), a pro-Beijing party since I was a kid. Otherwise, he would disown me,” said Hung. Up until the 2016 New Territories East by-election in the Legislative Council, he still voted for DAB’s Chow Ho-ding, Holden. Of course, he didn’t participate in the Umbrella Movement in 2014. He said the previous protests were about the political system, so he might not have felt a major threat to his freedom then. “It took time to implement universal suffrage, and Hong Kong wasn’t ready.” It wasn’t until the government forced the revision of the “Fugitive Offenders Ordinance” that he finally realized, “If the one country two systems could extradite the fugitives, this change would become a breaking point, with everything in line with the mainland China.”

In the November 2019 District Council election, it was Hung’s first time he didn’t vote for the DAB, “Voters voted based on their political stance. I don’t believe the pan-democrats but I don’t want the pro-establishment parties to win either. Although I still feel that in terms of local affairs, the pro-establishment parties had done more,” said Hung, since the bureaucrats are willing to give favors to the pro-establishment parties. For example, a relative of Hung was caught buying illegal cigarettes, he was suspected of reselling them. The Housing Department wanted to take back his public housing unit on the grounds of engaging in illegal activities. Later, it was the district councilor of the pro-establishment party that helped resolve the issue.

Hung and his family live in a tiny public housing unit, which doesn’t allow him to keep all the ‘stationery’ there, so he moved in with his friend. But he never thought about moving in with his girlfriend. “Rent is expensive. If we could afford to move out, we would get married. She is very dependent and needs to be taken care of. We will wait and talk about marriage later until the civil rights protests are over,” said Hung.

攝 photo：高仲明 Ko Chung Ming
文 text：蔡慧敏 Choi Wai Man
譯 translate：Joanna Ng

【 黎安友專文 l 中國如何看待香港危機 】

美國哥倫比亞大學的資深中國通黎安友（Andrew Nathan）教授最近在《外交事務》（Foreign Affairs）雜誌的專文，值得一看。

黎安友是台灣許多中國研究學者的前輩級老師，小英總統去哥大演講時，正是他積極促成。小英在美國的僑宴，黎安友也是座上賓。

這篇文章的標題是：「中國如何看待香港危機：北京自我克制背後的真正原因」。

文章很長，而且用英文寫，需要花點時間閱讀。大家有空可以看看。

Andrew這篇文章的立論基礎，是來自北京核心圈的匿名說法。以他在學術界的地位，我相信他對消息來源已經做了足夠的事實查核或確認。

這篇文章，是在回答一個疑問：中共為何在香港事件如此自制？有人說是怕西方譴責，有人說是怕損害香港的金融地位。

都不是。這篇文章認為，上述兩者都不是中共的真實顧慮。

無論你多痛恨中共，你都必須真實面對你的敵人。

中共是搞經濟階級鬥爭起家的，當年用階級鬥爭打敗國民黨。而現在，中共正用這樣的思維處理香港議題。

文章有一句話：“China’s response has been rooted not in anxiety but in confidence.” 這句話道盡階級鬥爭的精髓。

中共一點都不焦慮。相反地，中共很有自信，香港的菁英階級及既得利益的收編群體，到最後會支持中共。

這個分化的心理基礎，來自經濟上的利益。

文中還提到，鄧小平當年給香港五十年的一國兩制，就是為了「給香港足夠的時間適應中共的政治系統」。

1997年，香港的GDP佔中國的18%。2018年，這個比例降到2.8%。

今日的香港經濟，在中共的評估，是香港需要中國，而不是中國需要香港。

中共正在在意的，是香港的高房價問題。香港的房價，在過去十年內三倍翻漲。

文章是這樣描述：
“Housing prices have tripled over the past decade; today, the median price of a house is more than 20 times the median gross annual household income. The median rent has increased by nearly 25 percent in the past six years. As many as 250,000 people are waiting for public housing. At the same time, income growth for many Hong Kong residents has fallen below the overall increase in cost of living.”

無論你同不同意這些說法，都請你試圖客觀地看看這篇文章。

有趣的是，黎安友在文章中部分論點引述了他的消息來源（但他並沒有加上個人評論），部分是他自己的觀察。

#護台胖犬劉仕傑
Instagram: old_dog_chasing_ball

新書：《 我在外交部工作 》

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黎安友原文：

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-09-30/how-china-sees-hong-kong-crisis?fbclid=IwAR2PwHns5gWrw0fT0sa5LuO8zgv4PhLmkYfegtBgoOMCD3WJFI3w5NTe0S4

How China Sees the Hong Kong Crisis
The Real Reasons Behind Beijing’s Restraint

By Andrew J. Nathan September 30, 2019

Massive and sometimes violent protests have rocked Hong Kong for over 100 days. Demonstrators have put forward five demands, of which the most radical is a call for free, direct elections of Hong Kong’s chief executive and all members of the territory’s legislature: in other words, a fully democratic system of local rule, one not controlled by Beijing. As this brazen challenge to Chinese sovereignty has played out, Beijing has made a show of amassing paramilitary forces just across the border in Shenzhen. So far, however, China has not deployed force to quell the unrest and top Chinese leaders have refrained from making public threats to do so.

Western observers who remember the violent crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators in Tiananmen Square 30 years ago have been puzzled by Beijing’s forbearance. Some have attributed Beijing’s restraint to a fear of Western condemnation if China uses force. Others have pointed to Beijing’s concern that a crackdown would damage Hong Kong’s role as a financial center for China.

But according to two Chinese scholars who have connections to regime insiders and who requested anonymity to discuss the thinking of policymakers in Beijing, China’s response has been rooted not in anxiety but in confidence. Beijing is convinced that Hong Kong’s elites and a substantial part of the public do not support the demonstrators and that what truly ails the territory are economic problems rather than political ones—in particular, a combination of stagnant incomes and rising rents. Beijing also believes that, despite the appearance of disorder, its grip on Hong Kong society remains firm. The Chinese Communist Party has long cultivated the territory’s business elites (the so-called tycoons) by offering them favorable economic access to the mainland. The party also maintains a long-standing loyal cadre of underground members in the territory. And China has forged ties with the Hong Kong labor movement and some sections of its criminal underground. Finally, Beijing believes that many ordinary citizens are fearful of change and tired of the disruption caused by the demonstrations.

Beijing therefore thinks that its local allies will stand firm and that the demonstrations will gradually lose public support and eventually die out. As the demonstrations shrink, some frustrated activists will engage in further violence, and that in turn will accelerate the movement’s decline. Meanwhile, Beijing is turning its attention to economic development projects that it believes will address some of the underlying grievances that led many people to take to the streets in the first place.

This view of the situation is held by those at the very top of the regime in Beijing, as evidenced by recent remarks made by Chinese President Xi Jinping, some of which have not been previously reported. In a speech Xi delivered in early September to a new class of rising political stars at the Central Party School in Beijing, he rejected the suggestion of some officials that China should declare a state of emergency in Hong Kong and send in the People’s Liberation Army. “That would be going down a political road of no return,” Xi said. “The central government will exercise the most patience and restraint and allow the [regional government] and the local police force to resolve the crisis.” In separate remarks that Xi made around the same time, he spelled out what he sees as the proper way to proceed: “Economic development is the only golden key to resolving all sorts of problems facing Hong Kong today.”

ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS, MANY QUESTIONS

Chinese decision-makers are hardly surprised that Hong Kong is chafing under their rule. Beijing believes it has treated Hong Kong with a light hand and has supported the territory’s economy in many ways, especially by granting it special access to the mainland’s stocks and currency markets, exempting it from the taxes and fees that other Chinese provinces and municipalities pay the central government, and guaranteeing a reliable supply of water, electricity, gas, and food. Even so, Beijing considers disaffection among Hong Kong’s residents a natural outgrowth of the territory’s colonial British past and also a result of the continuing influence of Western values. Indeed, during the 1984 negotiations between China and the United Kingdom over Hong Kong’s future, the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping suggested following the approach of “one country, two systems” for 50 years precisely to give people in Hong Kong plenty of time to get used to the Chinese political system.

But “one country, two systems” was never intended to result in Hong Kong spinning out of China’s control. Under the Basic Law that China crafted as Hong Kong’s “mini-constitution,” Beijing retained the right to prevent any challenge to what it considered its core security interests. The law empowered Beijing to determine if and when Hong Kongers could directly elect the territory’s leadership, allowed Beijing to veto laws passed by the Hong Kong Legislative Council, and granted China the right to make final interpretations of the Basic Law. And there would be no question about who had a monopoly of force. During the negotiations with the United Kingdom, Deng publicly rebuked a top Chinese defense official—General Geng Biao, who at the time was a patron of a rising young official named Xi Jinping—for suggesting that there might not be any need to put troops in Hong Kong. Deng insisted that a Chinese garrison was necessary to symbolize Chinese sovereignty.

Statements made by U.S. politicians in support of the recent demonstrations only confirm Beijing’s belief that Washington seeks to inflame radical sentiments in Hong Kong.

At first, Hong Kongers seemed to accept their new role as citizens of a rising China. In 1997, in a tracking poll of Hong Kong residents regularly conducted by researchers at the University of Hong Kong, 47 percent of respondents identified themselves as “proud” citizens of China. But things went downhill from there. In 2012, the Hong Kong government tried to introduce “patriotic education” in elementary and middle schools, but the proposed curriculum ran into a storm of local opposition and had to be withdrawn. In 2014, the 79-day Umbrella Movement brought hundreds of thousands of citizens into the streets to protest Beijing’s refusal to allow direct elections for the chief executive. And as authoritarianism has intensified under Xi’s rule, events such as the 2015 kidnapping of five Hong Kong–based publishers to stand trial in the mainland further soured Hong Kong opinion. By this past June, only 27 percent of respondents to the tracking poll described themselves as “proud” to be citizens of China. This year’s demonstrations started as a protest against a proposed law that would have allowed Hong Kongers suspected of criminal wrongdoing to be extradited to the mainland but then developed into a broad-based expression of discontent over the lack of democratic accountability, police brutality, and, most fundamentally, what was perceived as a mainland assault on Hong Kong’s unique identity.

Still, Chinese leaders do not blame themselves for these shifts in public opinion. Rather, they believe that Western powers, especially the United States, have sought to drive a wedge between Hong Kong and the mainland. Statements made by U.S. politicians in support of the recent demonstrations only confirm Beijing’s belief that Washington seeks to inflame radical sentiments in Hong Kong. As Xi explained in his speech in September:
As extreme elements in Hong Kong turn more and more violent, Western forces, especially the United States, have been increasingly open in their involvement. Some extreme anti-China forces in the United States are trying to turn Hong Kong into the battleground for U.S.-Chinese rivalry…. They want to turn Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy into de facto independence, with the ultimate objective to contain China's rise and prevent the revival of the great Chinese nation.

Chinese leaders do not fear that a crackdown on Hong Kong would inspire Western antagonism. Rather, they take such antagonism as a preexisting reality—one that goes a long way toward explaining why the disorder in Hong Kong broke out in the first place. In Beijing’s eyes, Western hostility is rooted in the mere fact of China’s rise, and thus there is no use in tailoring China’s Hong Kong strategy to influence how Western powers would respond.

IT’S NOT ABOUT THE BENJAMINS

The view that Xi has not deployed troops because of Hong Kong’s economic importance to the mainland is also misguided, and relies on an outdated view of the balance of economic power. In 1997, Hong Kong’s GDP was equivalent to 18 percent of the mainland’s. Most of China’s foreign trade was conducted through Hong Kong, providing China with badly needed hard currencies. Chinese companies raised most of their capital on the Hong Kong stock exchange. Today, things are vastly different. In 2018, Hong Kong’s GDP was equal to only 2.7 percent of the mainland’s. Shenzhen alone has overtaken Hong Kong in terms of GDP. Less than 12 percent of China’s exports now flow through Hong Kong. The combined market value of China’s domestic stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen far surpasses that of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, and Chinese companies can also list in Frankfurt, London, New York, and elsewhere.

Although Hong Kong remains the largest offshore clearing center for renminbi, that role could easily be filled by London or Singapore, if Chinese leaders so desired.
Investment flowing into and out of China still tends to pass through financial holding vehicles set up in Hong Kong, in order to benefit from the region’s legal protections. But China’s new foreign investment law (which will take effect on January 1, 2020) and other recent policy changes mean that such investment will soon be able to bypass Hong Kong. And although Hong Kong remains the largest offshore clearing center for renminbi, that role could easily be filled by London or Singapore, if Chinese leaders so desired.

Wrecking Hong Kong’s economy by using military force to impose emergency rule would not be a good thing for China. But the negative effect on the mainland’s prosperity would not be strong enough to prevent Beijing from doing whatever it believes is necessary to maintain control over the territory.

CAN’T BUY ME LOVE?

As it waits out the current crisis, Beijing has already started tackling the economic problems that it believes are the source of much of the anger among Hong Kongers. Housing prices have tripled over the past decade; today, the median price of a house is more than 20 times the median gross annual household income. The median rent has increased by nearly 25 percent in the past six years. As many as 250,000 people are waiting for public housing. At the same time, income growth for many Hong Kong residents has fallen below the overall increase in cost of living.

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#富戶政策 #公屋資源 《富戶政策| Well-off tenant policies》

房委會為了確保好公屋資源能夠合理地分配給市民而實行而實施富戶政，以入息和資產作為因素，決定對租戶的資助，超逾上限的富戶，須繳交更高的租金，甚至須遷出單位。富戶政策有助加快公屋單位的流轉，騰出更多單位給有需要的家庭。但有評論指可騰空的單位有限，未能解決輪候時間過長的問題。

The well-off tenant policies are policies implemented by the Housing Authority to ensure the rational allocation of public housing resources. The income and assets are accessed to determine the amount of subsidy to tenants. The well-off tenant may need to pay for higher rent or even have move out of the unit. The well-off tenant policies will help speed up the circulation of public housing units and free up more units for families in need. However, some people commented that the units that could be vacated were limited and this failed to solve the problem of long waiting time.
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